

OO WTEB HYANNIS

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FROM BUNDY

TO GENERAL MCHUGH FOR PRESIDENT AND MR SORENSEN  
CITE CAP5542-62

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), S.D. 5H1 AND 11

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NUK-75-100  
BY SKF NARS. DATE 5/3/77

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS FOR MCCLOY:

NOVEMBER 23, 1962

YOU SHOULD SEE KUZNETSOV PROMPTLY TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN EFFECTING UNDERSTANDING OF OCTOBER 27 AND 28. YOU SHOULD BEGIN BY EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE THAT THIS BE WOUND UP VERY PROMPTLY, A DESIRE CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV EVIDENTLY SHARES. WAYS AND MEANS OF ENDING MATTER SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THIS REQUIREMENT.

YOU SHOULD GIVE KUZNETSOV OUR DRAFT DECLARATION (REVISED TEXT OF FINAL PARAGRAPH IN NEXT MESSAGE) AND EXPLAIN IT TO HIM AS THE MOST WE CAN DO -- AND MORE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY PROMISED -- IN THE LIGHT OF CUBAN REFUSAL TO PERMIT UN VERIFICATION OR SAFEGUARDS. YOU SHOULD REQUEST PROMPT STUDY AND RESPONSE. AT THE SAME TIME YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT A LONG AND FRUITLESS HAGGLE IN THE UN OVER DIFFERENCES WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY EXIST BETWEEN WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES MAY WITHER AWAY OVER TIME IF THINGS GO WELL. SUCH A HAGGLE IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST EITHER. IF OUR STATEMENT IS ONE WHICH THEY COULD NOT LIVE WITH IN UN, WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY WINDUP CAN BE OBTAINED BY USE OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, AS IN LAST PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH SOVIETS CAN READILY INTERPRET AS PROMISED ASSURANCE AGAINST INVASION. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST CHAIRMAN'S LAST MESSAGE WHICH DOES INDEED INTERPRET PRESIDENT'S LASTPRESS CONFERENCE IN THIS WAY.

IT WOULD ENTHUSE THAT THERE IS IN FACT NO PRESENT DANGER  
OF INVASION OF CUBA, BUT THAT WE CANNOT BE PUT IN POSITION  
OF GIVING A BLANKET GUARANTEE TO A MAN WHO HAS REFUSED  
TO COOPERATE WITH UN TO FULFILL UNDERSTANDING OF OCTOBER  
27 AND 28.

IF KUZNETSOV'S INITIAL RESPONSE IS COOL, YOU MAY WISH  
TO PRESS THE POINT THAT EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND  
CHAIRMAN SHOW NO SUCH SOVIET POSITION AND THAT IT MAY BE  
HELPFUL FOR KUZNETSOV AND PERHAPS MIKOYAN TO SEE PRESIDENT IN  
WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT WEEK SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW  
YORK WILL NOT GET OUT OF PHASE WITH PROMISING EXCHANGES  
BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

IF KUZNETSOV PRESSES CARIBBEAN INSPECTION SCHEME  
YOU SHOULD EXPRESS READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS POINT  
OUT AGAIN THAT ANY INSPECTION OF U.S. WOULD REQUIRE INSPECTION  
OF USSR. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THESE MATTERS CAN WELL BE  
DISCUSSED AT GENEVA IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATION ON  
SURPRISE ATTACK. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A COMPLEX PROBLEM  
GOING WELL BEYOND INITIAL UNDERSTANDING AND REQUIRING  
LONG DISCUSSION. THEREFORE WE SHOULD NOT HOLD UP ALL  
EXCHANGES OF ASSURANCES PENDING SUCH AN AGREEMENT BUT  
SHOULD PROMPTLY DO THE BEST WE CAN IN THE LIGHT OF CASTRO'S  
POSITION AND MOVE ON TO OTHER ISSUES. WE OF COURSE HAVE  
SERENE AND UNBOUNDED CONFIDENCE IN YOUR ABILITY TO PERSUADE  
KUZNETSOV THAT OUR DRAFT DECLARATION IS AN IDEAL SOLUTION

DTG: 23/2013Z NOV 1962

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